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Canon Law, Custom and Legislation: 
Law in the Reign of Alexander II  
 
Hector L MacQueen *  
 
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were a crucially formative period in the 
development of law in western Europe.1  The earlier century—characterised by one 
historian of law as a period of “extremely rapid, intense, and creative crisis”2—saw the 
recovery of the Digest of Justinian and the renewal of its study and use in teaching, first 
at the studium generale of Bologna in northern Italy, and subsequently elsewhere, at 
universities in the rest of Italy, southern France, Paris and Oxford.  The work of the 
school known as the Glossators was to culminate in the thirteenth century with the 
Summa Codicis of Azo (d.1230) and the Magna Glossa of Accursius (d.1263), “a huge 
compilation of glosses or apparatus of glosses to the whole Corpus Juris Civilis”.3  
Alongside the redevelopment of Roman or civil law marched the law of the Church, the 
canon law.  Around 1140 the hitherto scattered canons of the Church began to be 
brought together by Gratian in what became the unofficial compilation entitled Concordia 
discordantium canonum but better known as the Decretum.4  This provided the platform for a 
major expansion of the canon law and the juristic claims of the Church.  In 1234 Pope 
Gregory IX promulgated an official restatement of the canon law compiled by Raymond 
de Peñaforte (d.1240), and this came to be known as the Liber Extra.  The scholarly 
                                                          
*   Professor of Private Law, University of Edinburgh.  As always, I am very grateful to John Cairns and 
David Sellar for much helpful discussion and comment. 
1 See for general surveys e.g. F Wieacker (trans T Weir), A History of Private Law in Europe (Oxford, 1995), 
chs 2-4; O F Robinson, T D Fergus and W M Gordon, Introduction to European Legal History, 2nd edn 
(London, 1994) chs 2-4; R C van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Private Law (Cambridge, 1992) ch 3; 
M Bellomo (trans L G Cochrane), The Common Legal Past of Europe 1100-1800 (Washington DC, 1995), chs 
3-7; S Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1997), chs 1 and 2.; 
R W Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe: Volume I Foundations (Oxford, 1995), chs 7-9. 
2 Bellomo, Common Legal Past, 33. 
3 Robinson, Fergus and Gordon, European Legal History, 50. See further P Stein, Roman Law in European 
History (Cambridge, 1999). 
4 What we do not know about Gratian is well discussed in J T Noonan, “Gratian slept here: the changing 
identity of the father of the systematic study of canon law”, Traditio, xxxv (1979), 145-72. See further 
Southern, Scholastic Humanism, 283-310. A Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge, 2000), 
argues persuasively that there were two recensions of the Decretum, written between 1139 and 1158, the first 
probably by Gratian, the second (the text we know now) possibly not.  
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techniques which had been applied to the texts of Roman law were equally brought to 
bear upon the Corpus Juris Canonici, which also became part of the legal curriculum in the 
universities.  In the bull super speculam of 1219 Pope Honorius III abolished the teaching 
of the secular civil law at Paris, confining legal study there to the canon law.  While this 
was to create a division between canon and civil law of some significance for the future 
development of legal studies, it nevertheless remained true that “legista sine canonibus parum 
valet, canonista sine legibus nihil” (a legist [i.e. civil lawyer] without the canons is worth very 
little, a canonist without the civil laws nothing).5  The point was underlined when in 1235 
Pope Gregory IX authorised the teaching of civil law at Orleans to supplement that of 
canon law at Paris. 
 
The rules of the canon law were developed and applied throughout Europe by a 
vast machinery of courts and bureaucrats, the authority of which flowed ultimately from 
the Pope in Rome.  This authority was manifested at the local level not only by specially 
authorised papal representatives but also by structures established under the bishops of 
the dioceses into which the lands within the sway of the Church were divided.  Further, 
from such local decision-making machinery appeal structures led all the way to Rome 
itself.  Canon law laid claim, not just to the internal arrangements and governance of the 
Church, but also to a range of matters affecting the spiritual well-being of its flock.  
Through its courts the Church provided the means by which its jurisdictional claims 
could be made good.  While the precise impact of this upon medieval society varied from 
                                                          
5 The maxim was derived from Decretum Gratiani, Causa 7, Dictum 10. See further F Merzbacher, “Die 
Parömie ‘legista sine canonibus parum valet, canonista sine legibus nihil’”, Studia Gratiana, xiii (1967) 273-
82. For the citation of classical canon law materials see J A Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London, 1995), 
appendix 1. 
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place to place, there can be no doubt that the law of the Church did indeed form a 
universal element drawing together the legal culture of contemporary Europe.6   
 
 These developments of Roman and canon law would of course have their effects 
upon the laws and customs of the kingdom of the Scots, that “special daughter” of the 
Church, especially, as we shall see, in the reign of Alexander II (1214-1249).  But before 
we move into the details of those effects, it is necessary to provide some further context 
for the Scottish scene.  This comes from the neighbouring kingdom of England, where 
the twelfth century saw the massive expansion, regularisation, systematisation, and 
elaboration of royal justice, in particular under King Henry II (1153-1189), to become 
the common law of England.7  In the process, non-royal secular justice was, if not 
destroyed, reduced to a very subsidiary role indeed.  The scale of the English king’s 
achievement was unique in Europe.  Whether it was entirely the product of indigenous 
events, chance, or royal intent remains controversial, as does the debt which it owed to 
the growth of the learned laws just described.8  But there can be no doubt that by the 
time of Alexander II the English common law was a mature and articulate system.  A 
structure of royal courts dealt constantly with the disputes of the king’s subjects across a 
wide range of matters, deploying a bureaucratic system of writs by which issues for 
decision were formulated in set words the meaning and reach of which fell to be 
determined by the judges.  But the facts of disputes were determined by the jury, a sworn 
body of neighbours who would best know the truth of the matter.  The rules and 
                                                          
6 See generally Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, passim; R H Helmholz, The Spirit of the Classical Canon Law 
(Athens, Ga., 1996); H J Berman, Law and Revolution: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard, 
1983). 
7 For a fine introductory account see J Hudson, The Formation of the English Common Law: Law and Society in 
England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta (London, 1996). 
8 The controversy was stimulated by S F C Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridge, 
1976).  For an analysis of the debate provoked by this book see H L MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal 
Society in Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 1993; henceforth MacQueen, CLFS), ch 1; the major contributions 
since the composition of that analysis are J G H Hudson, Land, Law and Lordship in Anglo-Norman England 
(Oxford, 1994) and P A Brand, The Making of the Common Law (London and Rio Grande, 1992), 203-25. 
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principles of the common law had been stated before the end of the twelfth century in 
the work known as Glanvill, and they were made to apply to the king himself by Magna 
Carta in 1215.  Glanvill showed some influence from the learned laws, and some time 
during the first half of the thirteenth century a sustained effort was made to give an 
account of English law which would have aligned it much more clearly with Roman and 
canon law.  But in a development of immense importance in the legal history of western 
Europe, the mighty work known to us as Bracton had no enduring effect on English law, 
which instead developed within an essentially insular tradition and which came robustly 
to reject any influence from the Continent.9  Indeed this attitude may be detected in 
incipient form as early as 1236 when the barons of England declared at Merton that they 
did not wish to change their laws to bring them into line with the new canonical doctrine 
of legitimation of children by marriage of their parents subsequent to birth.10   While of 
course the canon law applied as much in England as anywhere else, the inheritance of 
land was essentially a matter for secular law, and the legitimacy of offspring in the eyes of 
the Church was not to affect the decision as to who was the heir for the purposes of the 
common law. 
 
 When Alexander II became king of Scots in 1214, his kingdom had likewise 
already known a century of development and modernisation in the royal administration 
of law and justice.11  This went alongside the processes which saw the introduction and 
steady expansion of tenurial structures of land-holding and the privileged trading centres 
known as burghs, as well as the reform of the church and substantial monastic 
endowment.  All these had involved the establishment and settlement within Scotland of 
                                                          
9 See G E Woodbine and S E Thorne, Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (4 vols, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968-77). The most recent analysis is J L Barton, “The mystery of Bracton”, Journal of Legal History, 
xiv (1993). 
10 English Historical Documents, iii, no 30 (c.9). 
11 For what follows in the next six paragraphs, see generally MacQueen, CLFS, 33-50. 
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foreign, in particular Anglo-French, influences, and it seems certain that one reason for 
the visible growth of royal justice in the period was the protection of those outsiders 
whose investment and skills had been attracted to the kingdom.  But it would be wrong 
to see this as indicative of a hostility or disjunction between the new and the old in the 
Scottish polity.  It is one of the key facts of this period that the “Anglo-Norman era in 
Scottish history” saw rather acculturation and assimilation of the diverse elements at 
work in the kingdom.  In particular this was true of the development of the law and 
custom which by the reign of Alexander’s son would be known as the common law of 
Scotland.12 
 
Our picture of law, justice and dispute settlement in the twelfth century is 
however very patchy.  Alongside the king’s own personal role, which is well attested, 
there was the creation of the office of justice or justiciar, the vice-regal powers of which 
must have included holding courts in the king’s name and dispensing that which his title 
would suggest.  Long before the end of the century, there were normally two justiciars at 
a time, one operating in Lothian, the other in, and occasionally styled of, Scotia (Scotland 
north of Forth); after 1185 there may also have been a justiciar of Galloway for at least a 
short period.13  It is less clear that the sheriff, another royal officer who makes his first 
appearance early in the twelfth century, held courts in the localities, or that there were 
independent courts in the burghs; but since sheriff and burgh courts were clearly in 
regular operation throughout the thirteenth century, a reasonable inference would be that 
they had at least embryonic form before the end of the twelfth.  It is probable that 
sheriffs and sheriffdoms were to be found throughout eastern Scotland from Berwick to 
                                                          
12 On “common law” see W D H Sellar, “The common law of Scotland and the common law of England”, 
in R R Davies (ed), The British Isles 1100-1500 (Edinburgh, 1988); idem, “The resilience of the Scottish 
common law”, in R Zimmermann and D L Carey Miller (eds), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law (Berlin, 
1997); MacQueen, CLFS, 2-3. 
13 Barrow, Kingdom, 101-9. 
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Inverness before 1200, and that the office was the lynchpin of local royal government in 
those territories.14 
 
 Officers apart, however, twelfth-century royal justice does not appear highly 
systematic or regularised, especially in comparison with contemporary developments in 
England.  It remained a matter of the king’s ad hoc personal intervention, or a favour 
granted to particular claimants, perhaps in the king’s own court (curia regis), rather than a 
matter of right or course for the king’s subjects.15  Certain general ideas do emerge from 
the sources: for example, that the king would intervene if there was a breach of his peace 
and protection, or if there was a default of justice (defectus justitiae) by some other person. 
Under these concepts there seem to have developed procedures for the recovery of debts 
and fugitive serfs (nativi).16  Perhaps most significant for the future was the possibility of 
the king issuing an order to somebody of whom another had made complaint, “to do 
right so that there shall be no complaint for default of justice”.17  There is also evidence 
that kings legislated, no doubt with the advice and assistance of their counsellors, and 
that the resultant “assizes” or “statutes” were intended to and did have a general effect 
which might extend beyond the reigns in which they were created, even though that 
might need reinforcement by subsequent re-enactment.18  Finally, the degree of system 
apparent in the basic regularity and standardisation of royal and other grants of land 
suggests that there were at least fairly general “norms” affecting land-holding in regard to 
such matters as tenure (holding land of a superior lord), categories of service rendered 
                                                          
14 The introduction and appendices to Fife Ct Bk, written by W C Dickinson, remain the indispensable 
starting point on the medieval sheriff. 
15 See MacQueen, CLFS, 42-3, 47-8. 
16 A Harding, “The medieval brieves of protection and the development of the common law”, Jur Rev, xi 
(1966). 
17 MacQueen, CLFS, 194-5. 
18 Ibid, 86-8. 
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for such holdings (knight service, free alms and burgage), and inheritance (male 
primogeniture, with succession opening to females in the absence of a son).19 
 
Perhaps the king’s primary responsibility was the preservation and, where 
necessary, the restoration of peace in his realm.  By the middle of the twelfth century 
there had emerged a concept of the “pleas of the crown”, including the especially 
horrendous crimes which it was the king’s right and duty to punish.20  This must be seen 
at least partly against the background of an “honour” society in which a person wronged 
(or his kin, if the wrong was homicide) was obliged to seek vengeance or lose face 
altogether.  But honour might be restored by the provision of appropriate compensation 
by the wrongdoer to the victim and his kin.21  There are signs, however, that the king, 
perhaps encouraged by the Church, was setting his sights against at least some aspects of 
both the vengeance and the compensation aspects of the honour code, as involving 
either an inevitable spiral of violence or the condonation of mortal sin.  Thus in 1197 the 
magnates and prelates swore to assist King William to take vindicta of (i.e. punish) 
wrongdoers, and not themselves to take pecunia from them so that justice was not done.22  
Another institution for the preservation of peace in which king and Church seem to have 
joined forces was ecclesiastical sanctuary, within which one accused of wrongdoing could 
take at least temporary shelter from his victim and their kin.  Twelfth-century grants 
show that in at least some of these—for example, the Stow of Wedale, Tyninghame and 
                                                          
19 G W S Barrow, “The Scots charter”, in H Mayr-Harting and R I Moore (eds), Studies in Medieval History 
presented to R H C davis (London, 1985); P R Hyams, “The charter as a source for the early common law”, 
Journal of Legal History, xii (1991), 179-80; MacQueen, CLFS, 248-9. I resist here the temptation to embark 
upon the debate stimulated by S Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: the medieval evidence reinterpreted (Oxford, 1994), 
but would observe that her conclusions deserve to be tested against the Scottish material. 
20 RRS, ii, no 80; APS, i, 374-5 (c.12). The list included murdrum (secret killing), premeditated assault, rape, 
arson and robbery. 
21 The classic study remains J M Wormald, “Bloodfeud, kindred and government in early modern 
Scotland”, Past and Present, no 87 (1980), especially at 57-66. See also H L MacQueen, “Scots law under 
Alexander III”, in N H Reid (ed), Scotland in the Reign of Alexander III 1249-1286 (Edinburgh, 1990), 90-2. 
22 APS, i, 377, c 20. This assize appears to be modelled upon the edictum regium of Hubert Walter in England 
in 1195 (as to which see Hudson, English Common Law, 138): Barrow, Kingdom, 111; A A M Duncan, Scotland: 
The Making of the Kingdom (Edinburgh, 1975), 201-3. 
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perhaps Innerleithen and Torphichen—the peace of the Church was given additional 
support and a wider territorial scope by that of the king, and it seems clear that this was 
intended to prevent feuds from escalating in further violence and bloodshed.23 
 
But there was no sense in which even an ambitious and assertive royal 
government sought a monopoly in the dispensation of justice or the declaration of law.  
The survival in the thirteenth and later centuries of local customary laws and offices such 
as the laws of Galloway, the law of Clan Macduff, the toiseachdeor and others is enough to 
show that royal justice in the twelfth century must be set against a backcloth of diversity 
and variety even before we begin to take into account the fast-maturing legal system of 
the church.24  Royal grants to both secular and ecclesiastical landholders of the right to 
hold courts confirm the absence of a desire to claim exclusivity for the king and his 
officers in the administration of law, although they do suggest the currency of the idea of 
the king as the fount of justice in his realm, especially when his right to correct failures of 
justice in the grantee’s court is asserted alongside the grant of jurisdiction.25 
 
 Twelfth-century grants of courts frequently refer to the beneficiary’s right to hold 
duels and ordeals in them as the means of determining where right lies in disputes 
coming before them.26  Probably such modes of proof were exceptional, for use only in 
cases where no other evidence or means of resolving the dispute was available.27  There 
are examples of decisions based upon the testimony of local people or the assertions of 
older persons present as to the custom in the matter, and by the end of the twelfth 
                                                          
23 See H L MacQueen, “Girth: the law of sanctuary and society in Scotland”, in J W Cairns and O F 
Robinson (eds), Critical Studies in Ancient Law, Comparative Law and Legal History: Essays in honour of Alan 
Watson (Oxford, 2001). 
24 See W D H Sellar, “Celtic law and Scots law: survival and integration”, Scottish Studies, xxix (1989); H L 
MacQueen, “The laws of Galloway: a preliminary survey”, in R D Oram and G P Stell (eds), Galloway: Land 
and Lordship (Edinburgh, 1991). 
25 MacQueen, CLFS, 35-7, 42. 
26 Ibid, 38. 
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century juries were in occasional use at least in the king’s own court.28  But nonetheless 
the existence and use of the judicium Dei demonstrate the need to avoid anachronism in 
talking about courts and their functions in this period.  Courts were essentially gatherings 
of people presided over by an officer or lord who should not in any meaningful sense be 
compared with a modern judge.  Rather than adjudication, the aim of the court seems 
more often to be the resolution of the dispute by negotiation and the exertion of 
pressure on the contending parties to settle the matter.  As Anglo-French influence came 
to be felt in the course of the century, the gatherings that made up the court were 
increasingly formalised in terms of “suit of court”, a duty to attend and give judgement at 
the lord’s court which was incumbent upon his tenants and sprang from their tenurial 
relationship with him.29  But equally older influences survived in the frequent presence in 
courts of the britheamh, Latinised as judex, a representative of the Gaelic element in 
Scottish society, and the repository of the customs by which the court might be guided in 
its procedures and decision-making.30  The active role assumed by this officer in royal 
and other courts well into the thirteenth century suggests a significant role in the 
blending of the older customs into the newer rules which ensured that in Scotland there 
was nothing to parallel the cleavage of native and Anglo-French laws characteristic of 
later medieval Ireland and Wales.31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 R Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: the medieval judicial ordeal (Oxford, 1986), 26-33, 106-9, 114-6. 
28 MacQueen, CLFS, 48. Note also the deferral to the decision of the oldest judex in the case of the dispute 
between the célidé of Loch Leven and Sir Robert the Burgundian c.1128 (ESC, no 80). 
29 MacQueen, CLFS, 37. 
30 Barrow, Kingdom, 69-82. 
31 J Bannerman, “The Scots language and the kin-based society”, in D S Thomson (ed), Gaelic and Scots in 
Harmony: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Languages of Scotland (Glasgow, 1990); MacQueen, 
“Alexander III”, 93-4. 
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We may complete this sketch of the structures of law and justice in the twelfth 
century with some observations about the position in the Scottish Church.32  Diocesan 
and parochial structures were firmly established in the course of the period.33  A further 
important development in the last quarter of the twelfth century was the establishment of 
the independence of the ecclesia Scoticana (Whithorn or Galloway always excepted) from 
the sway of York or Canterbury.  A series of Papal bulls, culminating probably around 
1192 in Cum universi,34 declared that not only was Scotland a special daughter of the 
Papacy,  but also that disputes about the possessions of the Scottish church should be 
determined within the kingdom by Scots or papal appointees, unless an appeal had been 
made to the papal courts in Rome.35 
 
There is evidence that pre-Gratian canon law materials were known in Scotland,36 
and there cannot be much doubt that the Decretum was also in circulation there.  Before 
the end of the twelfth century there were diocesan functionaries in Aberdeen, Glasgow 
and St Andrews known as “officials”, whose task was to administer the canon law in 
consistory courts held under episcopal authority.37  Indeed, almost all the officials of 
whom we have knowledge before 1214 were university men, most probably in decreets.38  
                                                          
32 See generally G Donaldson, Scottish Church History (Edinburgh, 1985), 40-5; S D Ollivant, The Court of the 
Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh, 1982), especially at 22-7; P C Ferguson, Medieval Papal 
Representatives in Scotland 1125-1286 (Edinburgh, 1998). 
33 Donaldson, Scottish Church History, 11-24; I B Cowan, The Parishes of Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 1967). 
34 See most recently A D M Barrell, “The background to Cum universi: Scoto-papal relations, 1159-1192”, 
Innes Review, xlvi (1995). 
35 For comment, see H L MacQueen, “Regiam Majestatem, Scots law and national identity”, SHR, lxxiv 
(1995), 9. 
36 See ESC no 263 (a grant of the old priory of Loch Leven by Bishop Robert of St Andrews to the priory 
of St Andrews 1152x1153 “et cum his libris, id est … exceptiones ecclesiasticarum regularum”); D Baird 
Smith, “Canon law”, in H McKechnie (ed), The Sources and Literature of Scots Law, (Edinburgh, 1936), at 187 
observes that this book “may have been the Decretum or Panormia of Saint Ivo of Chartres”. For Ivo see 
Southern, Scholastic Humanism, 252-61. 
37 Watt, Fasti, 23, 187, 323. 
38 For Matthew and Walter, officials of Aberdeen, see Watt, Fasti, 23, and Watt, Dictionary, 1, 563; for 
William, official of Brechin, see Watt, Fasti, 56, and Watt, Dictionary, 582; for Matthew official of Dunkeld 
(possibly the same man as Matthew official of Aberdeen, above), see Watt, Fasti, 124, and Watt, Dictionary, 
1, 489; for John de Huntingdon, official of Glasgow, see Watt, Fasti, 187, and Watt, Dictionary, 273 (but 
note that John’s predecessor, Richard de Hassendean, does not appear in the latter work); and for Ranulf 
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Papal judges-delegate had also begun to become familiar figures by 1200, and their use in 
Scotland was to become commonplace from the pontificate of Innocent III (1198-
1216).39  All this meant that men with knowledge and experience of the learned laws 
were at work as judges, pleaders and ecclesiastical administrators in Scotland by this time: 
an outstanding example is William Malveisin, described by a contemporary as utriusque 
jurisperitus, that is, learned in both the canon and the civil laws, bishop first of Glasgow in 
1199 and then of St Andrews from 1202 until his death in 1238.40  Malveisin’s career in 
Scotland was to last some fifty years, with much of that time spent in the service, first of 
King William, and then, as we shall see further below, of King Alexander II.  He also 
acted as a judge-delegate on at least three occasions.41  Another clerk learned in the laws 
whose career was to straddle the two reigns was Master Peter of Paxton (d.c.1230), who 
served in the household of King William’s brother, Earl David of Huntingdon, from the 
1180s, and who on 12 November 1219 pledged his copies of the Digestum Novum, Codex, 
Infortiatum and Institutes—that is, most of the core texts of Roman law—to the abbot and 
convent of Holyrood in security of a loan.42  But Master Peter’s career was spent more in 
England than in Scotland, his Paxton being in the earldom of Huntingdon rather than 
the estate in Berwickshire. 
 
 The Church could also bring effective pressure to bear on the secular law and 
customs.  The important concept of “default of justice” which underpinned at least some 
                                                                                                                                                                      
de Wat and Laurence de Thornton, officials of St Andrews, see Watt, Fasti, 323, and Watt, Dictionary, 531, 
576-7. 
39 Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, 120-2. 
40 For his career, which was to extend into the reign of Alexander II until his death in 1238, see Watt, 
Dictionary, 374-9. See also D D R Owen, William the Lion: Kingship and Culture 1143-1214 (East Linton, 1997), 
in which it is suggested that Malveisin was the Guillaume le Clerc who composed the Roman de Fergus.  W 
W Scott suggests that he may have been the author of Scottish annals based on the Melrose Chronicle: Chron 
Bower, ix, 251-259.  See also A A M Duncan, “Roger of Howden and Scotland, 1187-1201”, in B E 
Crawford (ed), Church, Chronicle and Learning in medieval and early Renaissance Scotland (Edinburgh, 1999), 145-
51. 
41 Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, 128. 
42 Registrum Antiquissimum of the Cathedral Church of Lincoln, ed. C W Foster and K Major, 12 vols (Lincoln 
Record Society, 1931-73), iii, no 821 (facsimile also on facing page); Stringer, Earl David, 152.  
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royal intervention in other courts had roots in pre-Gratian canon law.43  Influence could 
be exercised through the activity of ecclesiastics in government:  William Malveisin was 
the king’s chancellor as well as bishop of Glasgow from 1199 to 1202, for example.  
Equally it might come directly from the Papacy itself.  As early as 1110 x 1113 Pope 
Paschal II was writing to Turgot the bishop of St Andrews urging him to ensure that the 
laity in Scotland conformed to the canonical norms of marriage.44  In 1200 Pope 
Innocent III instructed King William about the right of sanctuary afforded to those who, 
having committed offences, fled to churches “that, through reverence for the sacred 
place, they may escape the penalty they have incurred”.45  Drawing on “the prescriptions 
of the sacred canons and the teaching of the civil laws”, Innocent laid down a series of 
propositions distinguishing between the position of free men and serfs, and concluded: 
 
Do you therefore, very dear son, see to it that when in the kingdom any such case occurs 
you proceed according to the distinction hereinbefore drawn, that the honour and 
immunity of churches may be preserved intact and the occasion of evil speaking be 
taken away from men of a perverse disposition. 
 
Around the same time John de Belmeis, the former archbishop of Lyons, wrote to 
Malveisin as bishop of Glasgow to condemn the involvement of the clergy in judicial 
duels or ordeals.46  It thus seems clear that the Church sought to exercise as much of a 
voice in the development of secular law and custom as it had in relation to its own. 
 
 One of the issues which provoked Papal letters to the king of Scots was 
competition between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction.  Early in the thirteenth 
century Pope Innocent III sternly rebuked King William for allowing to be decided in 
the king’s court a case about the right of patronage in the church of Leuchars, disputed 
                                                          
43 Helmholz, Classical Canon Law, 119-20, 132-4. 
44 R Somerville (ed), Scotia Pontificia: Papal Letters to Scotland before the Pontificate of Innocent III (Oxford, 1982), 
no 2. See further Duncan, Scotland, 130; W D H Sellar, “Marriage, divorce and concubinage in Gaelic 
Scotland”, Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness, li (1980), 474-5. 
45 D Patrick (ed), Statutes of the Scottish Church 1225-1559 (Edinburgh, 1907), 205 (from the Decretals, book 3 
title 49 c 6). 
 13 
by St Andrews cathedral priory and Saer de Quinci, lord of Leuchars.47  The papal 
disapproval does not seem to have prevented the successful assertion of secular 
jurisdiction in the case any more than it did shortly afterwards in the celebrated litigation 
between Melrose abbey and the earl of Dunbar over the lands of Sorrowlessfield near 
Earlston.  Here the earl persistently refused to answer before judges-delegate the monks’ 
complaint of his violent occupation of the lands, pleading that as the case concerned a 
lay tenement it ought to be heard before a secular court.  The case was finally settled in 
King William’s full court at Selkirk.48  In both disputes the ecclesiastical argument was 
that when cases concerned land granted in alms, both the custom of the realm and the 
custom of the Scottish church gave jurisdiction to the Church courts; but the evidence of 
these two cases is that this claim could easily be countered with one that the lands were 
lay and that there was no standard procedure available comparable to the English assize 
Utrum of 1164, under which it could be determined whether land was a lay fee or held in 
alms.49 
 
 With all this material in mind, let us now turn to events in the reign of Alexander 
II.  The first point to make is the continuing personal involvement of the king himself in 
matters of law and the dispensation of justice.50 One near-contemporary chronicler 
                                                                                                                                                                      
46 Ibid, 292. See further Duncan, “Roger of Howden”, 146-8. 
47 T M Cooper, Select Scottish Cases of the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1944), 7-8; Barrow, Kingdom, 90; 
Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, 181. 
48 Cooper, Cases, 9-11. See further on this case MacQueen, CLFS, 108, and Ferguson, Medieval Papal 
Representatives, 138-40.  
49 On the assize Utrum, see Hudson, English Common Law, 129. 
50 Note here the somewhat stereotypical comments of the later medieval chronicler Andrew Wyntoun: 
“This Alexander kynge of Scotlande / Was throw his lande trawalande / Haldande cowrttyis and iustrys / 
And chastyt in it al reweryis” (Chron Wyntoun (Amours), v, 82, 83).  Walter Bower also presents a 
conventional picture of the king: “supporter of orphans, protector of pupils [in the technical legal sense of 
boys under 14 and girls under 12], hearing the complaints of widows and the poor in person” (Chron Bower, 
v, 192). For the king’s special obligations to protect orphans, pupils, widows and the poor, see MacQueen, 
CLFS, 220-1. The Roman and canon law roots of this, linked to jurisdiction ex defectu justitiae, are discussed 
in Helmholz, Classical Canon Law, 116-44. 
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observed that he was a “lover of strict law”.51  An illustration of this may be the 
controversy mooted in the king’s court between Helen de Burneville and Henry of 
Stirling concerning the former’s claim to a third (terce) of the lands which at the time of 
her husband’s death had been held by her now deceased mother-in-law as “dotalicium”.  
The king is recorded as wishing to have a certain rule on this matter and to have declared 
for law that a widow was entitled to terce not only from the lands which her husband 
had held at the day of his death but also from those falling to his estate post mortem.52  
There are other examples of the king confirming the settlement of disputes in the curia 
regis, including a remarkable one where the authority of his court seems to have been 
interponed in confirmation of an amicable composition reached by Newbattle and 
Holyrood abbeys before papal judges-delegate.53  Again, on 8 April 1235 the king and his 
barons were ad colloquium at Kirkliston when an amicable composition involving the 
correct interpretation of charters was reached there between Melrose abbey and Roger 
Avenel as to the latter’s hunting rights in the monks’ lands in Eskdale.54   
 
But an important development for which there seems to have been little 
precedent before Alexander’s time was the description of a court as curia regis even 
though the king himself does not seem to have been present, and in which instead royal 
officers such as the justiciar, sheriff, and chamberlain presided.55  We have here an 
indication of the increasing regularisation of royal justice.  There is also a greater sense of 
organisation in the justiciary arrangements: the justiciar of Lothian makes a first 
appearance under that style in 1219, and that title and that of the justiciar of Scotia 
                                                          
51 Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 559. Cf Chron Bower, v, 190, where the king is pictured as a “lover of equity and 
justice”. On the contemporary concepts of “equity” and “strict law” see Bellomo, Common Legal Past, 161. 
52 APS, i, 401 (c.10). 
53 Ibid, 405-6, cc 2, 3; Cooper, Cases, 25-6. 
54 APS, i, 408 (c.7). 
55 MacQueen, CLFS, 48-9. 
 15 
appear regularly in documents from then on.56  This may have been due to the 
establishment of a clerk of justiciary, at least for Lothian, probably no later than the 
1220s,57 which in turn may have helped to formalise the keeping of records of the 
justiciars’ activities.58  The first known clerk of justiciary, Master David, probably of 
Braid, was a university man.59  The sheriff and burgh courts also come into much clearer 
focus in Alexander’s reign, and the sheriffdom system, well established in the eastern half 
of the country as noted earlier, was extended into the Gaelic west at Dumbarton and into 
Galloway following the partition of the lordship there after the death of Alan of 
Galloway in 1234.60  But there does not seem to have been a justiciar of Galloway during 
the reign.  A statute of 1245 laid down certain procedures to be followed in criminal 
matters by the justiciar of Lothian, “except in Galloway, which has its own special 
laws”.61  The implication seems to be that Galloway would otherwise have fallen within 
the jurisdiction of Lothian for justiciary purposes. 
 
The recognition here of Galloway’s “special laws”62 confirms that the steady 
regularisation of royal justice did not necessarily entail the destruction of the local 
customs prevailing in the various parts of the kingdom.  The reference is to the 
customary system for the preservation of the peace and the arrest of wrongdoers by 
sergeants acting under local lords, and is probably to be linked to a kin-based system of 
compensation payments by which amends were made for wrongdoing.63  A similar 
system prevailed in Carrick and Lennox, where in the 1220s the earls declared that the 
clergy of the earldoms should not be liable to give hospitality to their sergeants (also 
                                                          
56 Barrow, Kingdom, 104-6. 
57 Barrow, Kingdom, 129-30. 
58 Arbroath Lib, i, nos 227, 230 and 294; Barrow, Kingdom, 99, 117. 
59 Watt, Dictionary, 61. 
60 See further below, 000. 
61 APS, i, 403 (c.14). 
62 The phrase has overtones of jus proprium, as distinct from the jus commune of the kingdom. 
63 MacQueen, “Laws of Galloway”, passim. 
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known as kethres, according to the source).64 But Galloway was also the scene of 
suppression of local custom.  The partition of the lordship in 1234, which has already 
been mentioned, was the outcome of an imposition of the Anglo-French rules of 
succession under which daughters could inherit in the absence of legitimate sons, with 
division taking place amongst them if there was more than one.  But Alan lord of 
Galloway did leave a son, Thomas, who was illegitimate in the eyes of the canon law and 
therefore ineligible to inherit under the general law, but whose claim to become his 
father’s successor in the lordship was recognised by the chiefs and men of the clans of 
Galloway.  Their rising in support of Thomas’ claim was swiftly crushed in 1235, but the 
issue, like the long-lived Thomas himself, had still sufficient vigour towards the end of 
the thirteenth century to be a matter of concern to King Alexander III on the day before 
his death in 1286, as well as subsequently to the conquering King Edward I of England.65  
 
There is also a good deal of evidence for the continuing vigour of lords’ courts 
between 1214 and 1249.  For present purposes, the most important observation about 
these courts is that they continued to be places in which the tenurial relationship between 
lord and tenant could be worked out, through such processes as the granting and 
resignation of a holding, disciplinary procedures concerning the tenant’s failure to 
perform the services owed to the lord for his lands, or disputes about who was entitled to 
hold the lands.  An example of the last can be found in the 1220s, when Patrick of 
Naughton quitclaimed the lands of Moncreiffe to David de Munehtes and his heir in 
perpetuity in the court of Philip de Moubray.66  The interaction of these courts with the 
outside world can however be seen in the presence at this case of the king’s chancellor, a 
                                                          
64 Glasgow Reg, i, nos 139, 141. 
65 Duncan, Scotland, 530-1; G W S Barrow, Robert Bruce and the community of the realm of Scotland, 3rd edn 
(Edinburgh, 1988), 5-6, 112. 
66 Moncreiffs, ii, appendix no II. 
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cleric named Master Matthew (who was therefore a university man).67  Also present was 
Bredi Portanache, then judex, most likely of Strathearn, perhaps an illustration of the 
importance of such officers as links between the older customs and the Anglo-French 
and canon law influences also at work.  Another interesting instance where we can see 
the lord’s court interacting with the king’s c.1225 is in a charter of Alan of Galloway as 
lord of Cunningham where he confirms Hugh of Crawford in the third part of the toun 
of Stevenston which had been sold to him by Margaret daughter of Adam Loccard.  
Margaret had quitclaimed the lands and rendered them to Hugh in Alan’s court, but for 
greater security she also quitclaimed Hugh in the king’s court.68  This document “surely 
hints at the potential inability of Alan’s court on its own to sustain Hugh’s title.  It may 
not have been Alan who was being forestalled here so much as some possible claimant in 
the king’s court who would be able to undo what had happened in Alan’s court.”69 
 
Developments in the world of secular law and custom went alongside the 
continued growth of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  Officials can be found in virtually every 
Scottish diocese in the period, and on the whole they continued to be university men, 
presumably having studied decreets.70  There was also a considerable growth in the use of 
papal judges-delegate. Nearly half of the 158 cases identified by Dr Paul Ferguson as 
having taken place before judges delegate between 1165 and 1286 occurred in the reign 
                                                          
67 For Master Matthew the Scot, see Watt, Dictionary, 489-90; he was probably a graduate of Paris in Arts 
and Theology, but may just possibly be identified with Master Matthew of Aberdeen who was official of 
Dunkeld 1203 x 1210 (ibid, 1). 
68 Printed as an appendix to Stringer, “Periphery and core in thirteenth-century Scotland: Alan son of 
Roland, lord of Galloway and constable of Scotland”, in A Grant and K J Stringer (eds), Medieval Scotland: 
Crown, Lordship and Community (Edinburgh, 1993), 110-11. 
69 MacQueen, CLFS, 45. 
70 For Richard and “W.” officials of Aberdeen see Watt, Fasti, 23, and Watt, Dictionary, 468-9 and 561-2; for 
Daniel and Maurice, officials of Argyll, Watt, Fasti, 38; for Henry de Norham official of Brechin, Watt, 
Fasti, 56, and Watt, Dictionary, 430; for Durand and Geoffrey, officials of Galloway, Watt, Fasti, 140; for 
Richard de Ancrum official of Glasgow, Watt, Fasti, 187; for “M.” and “J.”, officials of the Isles, Watt, 
Fasti, 212; for William Agnus official of Moray, Watt, Fasti, 244, and Watt, Dictionary, 3; for Walter de 
Mortimer and Andrew de Aberdeen officials of St Andrews, Watt, Fasti, 323, and Watt, Dictionary, 1, 419-
20; and for Alexander de St Martin official of Lothian Watt, Fasti, 327, and Watt, Dictionary, 478. It is 
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of Alexander II.71  Many if not all of these judges-delegate must have been, like the ones 
who decided the great dispute over the lands of Monachkenneran in 1233 “wise men 
learned in both the canon and the civil laws”.72  A striking example may be Master 
Laurence of Thornton, “the single most frequent judge-delegate of the period [1209-
1238x1240]”, and also official of St Andrews diocese between 1203 and 1224 as well as a 
close associate of Bishop Malveisin.73  
 
The increasing role of judges-delegate during Alexander II’s reign must have 
been apparent to contemporaries.  This may be evident in the increasing number of 
clashes between the ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions, especially where a dispute 
over land broke out between a layman and the Church in some shape or form.  Like his 
father before him, King Alexander received papal letters reproaching him for allowing 
suits about land held in free alms to come before secular tribunals.74  An apparent 
innovation of his administration was a form of royal prohibition by which litigation in an 
ecclesiastical forum could be halted by the claim that the matter was secular.  An early 
example is the case between Robert Hood and the bishop of Moray over the lands of 
Llanbryde in 1225, which began before judges-delegate but was prohibited by the king, 
“asserting that the aforesaid manor was his barony and that therefore it should take place 
in the royal and not an ecclesiastical court”.75  The royal letters or brieves which were 
used for this purpose probably took more or less the form found in the later “registers” 
of brieves, under which the Church court was prohibited from proceeding in cases of lay 
tenements.76  Their effectiveness is suggested by the precaution which churchmen seem 
                                                                                                                                                                      
worthy of mention that the officials of Argyll, Galloway and the Isles are not known to have been 
university men. 
71 See Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, Appendix I. 
72 Paisley Reg, 169. 
73 Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, 129; Watt, Fasti, 323; idem, Dictionary, 531. 
74 Scone Lib, no 120. See also Glasgow Reg, i, nos 158, 161; Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, 187. 
75 Moray Reg, appendix, 459 (no 6).  
76 Reg Brieves, 46 (no 64), 55 (nos 23-7); Formulary E, nos 4-7. 
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to have started to take, by obtaining from their opponents in litigation a renunciation of 
the king’s letters of prohibition.77   
 
But the picture of conflict between church and state should not be over-
dramatised.  As Dr Ferguson has pointed out, churchmen were frequently able to make 
claims to land against laymen successfully before judges delegate, while laymen often 
made claims against the Church in the same forum.78  Dr Ferguson concludes with 
appropriate caution:79 
 
The picture which seems to emerge here is one of occasional instances in which 
powerful laymen were able to defeat or delay their ecclesiastical opponents and to force 
them into the secular forum.  Secular jurisdiction was also invoked when the subject of 
the suit was of particular interest to the Crown … Where lesser men were defenders, 
and where such interests were not involved, the jurisdiction of papal judges-delegate 
seems seldom to have been challenged by secular jurisdiction.  As Duncan notes, 
however, a firm conclusion on this issue will require a comprehensive study not only of 
the cases before judges-delegate but also of the many compositions which may have 
resulted from litigation in the secular forum. 
 
The jurisdiction of the canon law in the affairs of the laity seems to have won 
acceptance in questions of status, marriage and legitimacy.80  At the very end of King 
Alexander’s reign and at the beginning of that of his successor, Alwin of Callendar and 
John of Kinross, both laymen, were litigating before papal judges-delegate over John’s 
claim that Alwin was illegitimate and therefore not entitled to inherit certain lands which 
would otherwise fall to John.81  The case nicely illustrates the interaction between the 
ecclesiastical and the secular in matters of law and litigation.  Since the lands in question 
were unquestionably a lay tenement, a judgement in John’s favour on the legitimacy point 
would not have concluded the process of recovering the lands.  He would have had to go 
off to the secular courts for that purpose.  But at the same time the substance of the 
                                                          
77 MacQueen, CLFS, 110. 
78 See Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives, 140-1, 181-2, 187-9. 
79 Ibid, 189. 
80 Ibid, 157-9. 
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canonical rules on marriage and legitimacy was crucial to the secular rules on inheritance 
of land.  As we have seen with the dispute about the succession in Galloway in 1234, one 
dubbed illegitimate by the canon law would be excluded from any claim to inherit. 
 
Major developments took place in the general canon law itself during the reign of 
Alexander II.  Apart from the promulgation of the Liber Extra in 1234, already 
mentioned, in November 1215 there took place in Rome under Pope Innocent III the 
Fourth Lateran Council, which ushered in a large number of major reforms, including, 
most significantly for our purposes, a prohibition upon clerical participation in the 
ordeal.82  Although the Council was attended by three Scottish bishops, including 
William Malveisin, and by Henry abbot of Kelso,83 there were problems in administering 
its reforms in Scotland through the lack of a metropolitan archbishop.  This led to the 
establishment by Pope Honorius III of the Provincial Council of the Scottish Church in 
1225.84  This was not only the deliberative body of the Scottish Church, but also both a 
legislative and a judicial body.  Donald Watt observes in his account of the Provincial 
Council:85 
 
Provincial councils everywhere after the Fourth Lateran Council were charged with 
reform of ‘mores’, meaning presumably prevailing customs of all kinds.  In Scotland, as 
elsewhere, a consequence was that the decades after 1215 saw local church leaders 
compiling collections of statutes for approval at both diocesan and provincial levels. … 
[T]he bulk of the Scottish provincial statutes is concerned with defining matters of local 
custom, rather than with emphasising the universal law of the Church. … Whatever a 
pope like Innocent III might think, the Corpus [Juris Canonici] was no monolithic code of 
law ready to be enforced everywhere throughout the Church: it was a quarry from which 
church lawyers were constantly excavating rules which they claimed to be the law of the 
Church, but which were interpreted in widely divergent ways by different schools of 
lawyers. 
 
                                                          
82 For a translation of the decrees of the Council, see English Historical Documents, iii, 643-76. The abolition 
of clerical participation in the ordeal is c 18 (ibid, 654). On the Council see J Sayers, Innocent III: Leader of 
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83 Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 405. 
84 Statutes of the Scottish Church, 1. 
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The Provincial Council was not the only body to issue legislation between 1214 
and 1249.  Perhaps the single most significant piece of legal material surviving from the 
reign of Alexander II is his statutes, which undoubtedly embody and reflect extremely 
important steps in the creation of the Scottish common law.  They appear in particular to 
give a new prominence to the jury as an instrument of justice in both civil and criminal 
matters, to reduce dependence on the duel and the ordeal, and, finally, to be the occasion 
of the introduction of the pleadable brieve of dissasine or novel dissasine, modelled on 
the crucially important English common law writ of novel disseisin. 
 
 The attribution of the statutes to Alexander II is not without problems.  In the 
earliest manuscript, the fourteenth-century Ayr MS, they are placed amongst the assizes 
of David I, and this tradition ran on until the sixteenth century.  But a separate tradition, 
of which the late fourteenth- or early fifteenth-century Bute MS appears to be the earliest 
example, assigns them to “Alexander son of king William”, along with dates and, in some 
later manuscripts, the personnel present when the statutes were enacted.86  Thus we are 
told that the most important group of statutes was passed at Stirling on the Sunday 
before the feast of St Luke the Evangelist in 1230 (13 October), in the presence of the 
king, the bishop of St Andrews (William Malveisin), Malcolm earl of Fife, William 
Comyn earl of Buchan and justiciar of Scotia, Thomas Melsanby prior of Coldingham, 
Walter Olifard justiciar of Lothian, Walter fitz Alan steward of Scotland, John Maxwell 
and many others.   In February 1245 a larger group of bishops, abbots, earls and others 
gave their consent and assent to further statutes of the king, while in May 1249 another 
                                                          
86 The general pattern of attribution is clear from the “Notice of the Manuscripts” and “Table of 
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group of magnates and prelates which included the justiciars of Scotia and Lothian met at 
Stirling to witness the king’s enactment of a statute.  While as they stand in the surviving 
manuscripts these attributions are not contemporary, it is difficult to imagine that a later 
medieval scribe could have invented what are undoubtedly lists of some of the most 
prominent of the king’s counsellors at the relevant times.  This tends to support the basic 
authenticity of the transmission of the texts from whatever form was taken by the 
originals into the copies and translations made by and for later medieval lawyers, 
although we cannot be sure that the exact wording of the originals has come down to us.  
 
 The deployment of the jury, and the downplaying of the duel and the ordeal, in 
these statutes has taken on significance mainly as the Scottish response to the abolition 
of clerical participation in the ordeal by the Church at the Fourth Lateran Council in 
1215.  Robert Bartlett has shown how this withdrawal of ecclesiastical support 
undermined the credibility of the ordeal as the judgement of God, and therefore 
presented a major crisis for the secular systems of justice throughout Europe.87  It seems 
clear that the need for alternative systems of proof which was universally felt in the 
difficult cases in which the ordeal had previously been available must also have been 
applicable in Scotland.  Ian Willock has rightly cautioned against seeing the statute of 
1230 as representing the definitive abolition of the ordeal in Scotland and its replacement 
with the jury (here described as a visnet) as a mode of proof, since in terms it is confined 
to cases of theft and robbery.88  Similarly, the statute which requires the use of a local 
group of persons (i.e. a jury) to consider the complaints of those “who ought not to 
fight” must be seen as a specific solution in a particular context - the loss and recovery of 
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moveable property - rather than an attempt to abolish the duel in all cases.89  But 
nonetheless the statute does reflect the influence brought to bear on the secular law by 
ecclesiastical pressure, personified at Stirling by Bishop Malveisin in particular.  He had 
attended the Lateran Council and had already been a no doubt willing recipient and 
disseminator of correspondence from other ecclesiastics railing against the judicial duel.90 
It was probably Malveisin again who, having remained in Rome after the Lateran 
Council,91 had procured from Pope Innocent III in 1216 a bull specifically condemning 
the “baneful custom” in Scotland by which the clergy could be compelled to undergo 
judicial duels.92   Prominent amongst the persons who under the 1230 statute were not to 
fight duels were men of religion, clerks and prebendaries;93 and this probably had some 
effect, to judge from two brieves of protection issued by the king in 1232, taking the 
monks of Melrose and Balmerino respectively under royal protection and instructing all 
his sheriffs to treat the causes of the monks as though they were the king’s own, 
including finding a champion (pugnatorem) for them if need be.94  
 
 As this evidence confirms, however, the duel continued to play a part in the 
administration of the law after 1230—indeed for some centuries after 1230.95  In 1242 
Walter Bisset was accused of the killing of Patrick of Atholl.  He offered to clear himself 
by duel or compurgation, while his accusers demanded that the accusation be put to a 
jury.  The issue seems never to have been resolved by formal process and Walter, having 
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put himself in the king’s mercy, abjured the realm.96  The story demonstrates how far the 
jury still was from displacing the duel, and it may also be part of the background to 
further legislation in 1245,97 when it was provided that the justiciar of Lothian should 
hold an inquest to identify wrongdoers within his jurisdiction since Christmas 1243.  
Those identified were to be arrested and brought before the justiciar and a faithful visnet, 
which would determine whether they were guilty of “murthra” (probably meaning secret 
killing, unseen by witnesses, as had happened in the slaying of Patrick of Atholl), robbery 
or similar felonies pertaining to the king’s crown.  If so, all their goods would be forfeit 
to the king.  But conviction of such lesser crimes as theft or homicide (i.e. killing other 
than murthra98) would lead to forfeiture to their lord.  The procedure of indictment by 
inquest and trial before the justiciar was to continue in future, but all those convicted of 
theft or homicide would be handed over to their lords to have justice carried out without 
any redemption save by the grace of the king.   
 
 The continuing role of lords’ courts in the punishment of crime suggests a certain 
continuity from one of the earlier statutes of 1230 which had restricted the power of 
lords to repledge wrongdoers to their own courts to certain cases only, i.e. where the 
accused was the lord’s liege man, serf, dweller on his lands or a member of his familia.  
This question was to be determined by lawful men of the country.99  Both acts therefore 
interposed a process of inquiry by inquest before proceedings might be carried forward 
in whatever was the appropriate forum. 
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As Geoffrey Barrow has observed, the procedure introduced in 1245 is highly 
reminiscent of the jury of presentment introduced in England by the Assize of 
Clarendon in 1166.100  But the influence of canonical criminal procedure must also be 
taken into account.  From early in the thirteenth century, and in particular after the 
Lateran Council in 1215, the Church was developing the accusatory process of the 
inquisition, “so-called”, writes James Brundage,101 
 
because it was conceived of as an investigatory process initiated by public authorities, 
such as judges, who operated through inquiry (per inquisitionem) into wrongdoing that was 
a matter of common knowledge or grave suspicion (notorium, manifesta and fama were the 
terms generally used to describe such affairs).   
 
The process was concerned with the “occult crimes”, such as heresy, which did not lend 
themselves to ready or decisive proof; and it is striking that the inquest established by the 
Scottish statute of 1245 was to concern itself with secret killings and robberies, violent 
crimes to which the only witness apart from the perpetrators might well be the victim.  A 
combination with direct English influence seems quite probable, however, since in a final 
provision of the 1245 statute, any knight indicted by the inquest was to have a visnet of 
other knights or freeholders of heritage.  This principle of “trial by peers”, found in 
Magna Carta (cc 21, 39, 59), was to be repeated in the last known legislation of the reign, 
at Stirling in May 1248.102  
 
 The awareness of English law and procedures which is thus apparent in the 1245 
statute is even more clear in the 1230 legislation introducing a procedure to remedy 
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dissasine.  As already noted, the model here was the famous assize of novel disseisin, 
invented in England in the 1160s (after “many wakeful nights”, according to Bracton103).  
The English writ enabled a plaintiff to bring before the king’s justices his complaint that 
the defendant had disseised him of his free tenement unjustly and without a judgment, 
and to have the issue determined by a recognition of twelve men of the neighbourhood 
in which the lands lay.  Restoration would follow a verdict in the plaintiff’s favour.  The 
influence of this writ can be best seen from the words of the 1230 statute itself:104 
 
The lord king Alexander also enacted at the said day and place that if anyone should 
complain to the lord king or his justiciar that his lord or any other person has dissaised 
him unjustly and without a judgment of any tenement of which he was previously vest 
and saised, and shall find pledges for the pursuit of his claim, the justiciar or the sheriff 
by precept of the king or the justiciar shall cause it to be recognosced by good men of 
the country if the complainer makes a just complaint.  And if it shall be recognosced and 
proved, the justiciar or the sheriff shall cause him to be resaised of the land of which he 
was dissaised, and the dissaisor shall be in the king’s mercy.  If however it shall be 
recognosced that the complainer has made an unjust complaint, the complainer shall be 
in the king’s mercy of ten pounds. 
 
 What is the significance of this statute?  It fits in with the general pattern of the 
1230 legislation in making available a standard procedure under which the issue in 
dispute would be resolved by a jury rather than by other means.  Although we lack direct 
evidence on the subject, it seems probable that before 1230 a dispute about who should 
hold a piece of land outside a burgh would generally have been resolved by a duel if it 
could not be settled by negotiation.105  The new action was also a crucial step towards the 
conversion of royal justice into a common law of the kingdom.  The statute was laying 
down a procedure to be automatically available to a complainer before the king or the 
justiciar.  It could be invoked by obtaining a “precept of the lord king”, that is, a royal 
brieve.  We know from later evidence that this brieve was in a standard form, the 
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wording of which came very close to that of the original statute.  Royal justice here was 
therefore no longer a favour or an ad hoc intervention; it was a matter of course or of 
right for the complainer.  
 
 The participants at Stirling in 1230 must also have had a very clear idea of the 
significance of the step they were taking.  The assize of novel disseisin had been at the 
very heart of the development of the English common law, and remained one of the 
most popular forms of action before the king’s justices.  Of the known actors at Stirling, 
perhaps the most significant here were the two justiciars, Walter Olifard of Lothian and 
William Comyn of Scotia.  In 1230 each had held office for a very long time:  Walter 
since 1215 and William for an even greater period, since 1205; they must have brought to 
the deliberations extensive experience of the problems actually encountered in court.  
Both men also belonged to the important group of the Scottish nobility who held lands 
in England as well as Scotland;106 they would therefore have been at least aware of the 
procedures used in the English royal courts.   
 
 What were the factors which led the gathering at Stirling to take the step of 
introducing an action for dissasine?  The statute’s reference to dissasine by the 
complainer’s “lord or any other person” suggests the possible relevance of a debate 
amongst English legal historians as to the origins of novel disseisin.  Was the assize 
originally simply a means of regulating the lord’s power to discipline tenants who failed 
to perform the services owed for their land by ejecting them from their tenement?  This 
would explain, amongst other things, the requirement that the disseisin be “unjust and 
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without a judgment”; a just judgment of the lord’s court was necessary before a tenant 
could be expelled from his holding.107   
 
But while this view has offered a powerful insight into a world in which disseisin 
could happen otherwise than through casual, almost anarchic violence, and links in an 
important way with the principle that the king would remedy defects of justice in the 
courts of others, it has not gained acceptance as the sole explanation for the 
development of the action.  In support of this conclusion, it may be noted, the Scottish 
statute does not see lords as the only dissaisors against whom redress might be sought.  
Another potential source of disseisin which emerges from the English evidence was the 
Church, enforcing its rights to land, not as a feudal lord, but under the canon law rules 
which required bishops to recover land unjustly alienated by their predecessors.  Could 
novel disseisin have been the means by which laymen who had acquired land from the 
Church were enabled to resist the processes of the canon law?108  Did the problem 
extend further, as our earlier discussion of the clashes between ecclesiastical and secular 
jurisdiction in cases about land may suggest, to the expulsion of laymen from their 
holdings following litigation before judges-delegate? 
 
I have suggested elsewhere that a dispute which was ongoing around 1230 before 
Walter Olifard as justiciar of Lothian may have been a specific trigger for legislative 
action in Scotland.109  The case was between Patrick, son of the earl of Dunbar, and the 
priory of Coldingham.  Patrick was said to be unjustly occupying the priory’s lands of 
Swinewood in Berwickshire.  The whole matter was eventually settled in Walter’s 
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justiciary court at Roxburgh in 1231, when Patrick renounced his claim and 
acknowledged the plenum ius of the priory to the lands.  Was this settlement obtained 
because the priory now had to hand a royal remedy by which its claim could be made 
good?  It may be significant that Thomas Melsanby, prior of Coldingham, was another 
who was present at Stirling in October 1230 to assent to the passage of the statute on 
dissasine.  But if there was a connection between this case and the statute, then it is 
worth noting that there does not appear to have been any tenurial relationship between 
Patrick and the priory, and that in this case it was the ecclesiastical organisation which 
successfully resisted the claims of the layman, even in the secular court.  
 
Discussion of the background to the introduction of the brieve of dissasine 
should also take account of the introduction of another pleadable brieve, that of 
mortancestry.  There are grounds for supposing that this brieve, which was also modelled 
on one of the key writs of the early English common law, the assize of mort d’ancestor, was 
introduced to Scotland before 1237, making it another innovation of Alexander II.110  
Certainly it was in use not long after the king’s death, when in 1253 Emma of Smeaton 
raised an action against Dunfermline abbey by royal letters of that name.111  Procedure 
under the brieve was similar to that for dissasine: generally it took place before the 
justiciar, and a jury or recognition was always used to determine the facts of the dispute.  
The brieve enabled a claimant to recover lands from the defender currently holding them 
by showing that he was entitled to inherit from one of a limited number of relatives.  
Thus, whereas dissasine protected security of possession, mortancestry protected security 
of inheritance.112  Again it has been suggested that the primary purpose of the English 
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action was to compel lords to enter the heirs of their deceased tenants and to limit their 
discretion when tenements held of them fell vacant through death of the incumbent.113  
This view has not commanded universal support, but no convincing or plausible 
alternative has since been put forward. 
 
There are a number of cases in Scotland in the 1230s and 1240s in which actions 
for the recovery of land were begun by royal brieve before the justiciar or the sheriff, 
many of them seeming to involve a “recognition”, that is, a jury or assize.  They may 
therefore be cases of either dissasine or mortancestry.114  Many of these do appear to 
involve disputes between lords and tenants, and in several of these the lord was the 
priory of Coldingham.  Thus between 1233 and 1235 Eda, Maria and William of Paxton 
sought to exercise a right of estovers in the priory’s wood at Restonside “by the lord 
king’s brieve of recognition addressed to Sir William Lindsay then sheriff of Berwick”.115  
At the time the priory claimed to be the superiors of Paxton.  Probably not long after, 
the priory was defending another action begun against it by one of its tenants “by the 
lord king’s brieve of recognition”, this time addressed to the justiciar of Lothian.  The 
tenant, Mariota of Chirnside, and her son Patrick were claiming one ploughgate at 
Renton, which was held of the priory.116  In 1247 Adam Spott impleaded Ranulf of 
Buncle “by precepts of the lord king” for certain lands in the defender’s lordship of 
Buncle, the action beginning in the sheriff court of Berwick but ultimately being settled 
before the justiciar of Lothian.117  Probably around 1250 another Mariota, daughter of 
Samuel, raised an action about the lands of Stobo by royal letters in the sheriff court at 
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Traquair.118  The defender in the action, the bishop of Glasgow, was the superior of 
Stobo, and, like the Paxton case, the substance of the action was probably rights in 
common claimed by the tenants in the superior’s land. 
 
In 1235 Gilbert son of Samuel impleaded Maeldomhnaich earl of Lennox before 
the justiciar of Scotia for the lands of Monachkenneran, having raised his action “by 
letters of the lord king”.119  This case involves a mixture of ecclesiastical and secular 
processes which may show how scenarios of dissasine could arise.  Monachkenneran 
pertained to the church of Kilpatrick which the earl had subinfeudated to Paisley abbey.  
The rector of Kilpatrick was the earl’s younger brother Dougal, who had alienated the 
lands to Gilbert in a transaction which the earl had then confirmed.  Enforcing the canon 
law rules against unjust alienation of church lands, the abbey recovered Monachkenneran 
by action before papal judges-delegate in 1233, but Gilbert remained contumaciously 
absent from the proceedings, meaning that the secular arm had to be brought in to 
enforce the judgment.  It was possibly at this stage that the earl had to eject  Gilbert, 
going against the earlier confirmation, and the latter’s reaction was perhaps to bring a 
brieve of dissasine.  In any event he obtained sixty silver marks from the earl in 
settlement of the claim.120 
 
This and the other cases mentioned above suggest that the exercise of lordship in 
land, claims to common rights, and the sometimes competing processes of canon and 
secular law do lie behind the situations in which we can see actions being raised by brieve 
in the royal courts.  The most probable explanation for the introduction of the brieve of 
dissasine in 1230, and its partner the brieve of mortancestry shortly afterwards, ought 
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therefore to take account of all these factors, as well as a royal interest, drawing upon the 
long-established duty of the king to hold the peace and prevent defaults of justice, in 
protecting security of both tenure and inheritance in relation to land.  The involvement 
of women as pursuers in many of the cases may also be important: were they struggling 
to ensure rights of inheritance and terce against reluctant lords and heirs?  Finally, many 
of the cases are about quite small areas of ground and involve claimants who can at best 
have been only the medieval equivalent of minor gentry in terms of their social status.  It 
is therefore possible that the brieves of dissasine and mortancestry were bringing to bear 
at this level of society the norms and customs already established amongst the higher 
echelons. 
 
A final consequence of the introduction of the brieves of dissasine and 
mortancestry may have been the formulation, or perhaps refocusing, of the brieve of 
right and the establishment of the important rule that no-one could be made to answer 
for the lands he held save through an action raised by royal brieve.  As already 
mentioned,121 in the twelfth century the king had enforced his peace and protection by 
commands to do right.  We also know from evidence after the reign of Alexander II that 
alongside the brieves of dissasine and mortancestry there was later a brieve de recto—of 
right—also used for the recovery of lands in dispute.122  Most probably this brieve 
developed its specific characteristics after dissasine and mortancestry had carved out their 
respective niches in the protection of sasine and inheritance.  This development left a 
number of problem areas untouched, and it seems clear that in the later medieval law the 
brieve of right came to perform a residual or “sweeper” function in cases about land.  
The insistence from 1230  that dissasines had to be carried out justly and by judgement 
may well have led lords and other claimants unable to use mortancestry but seeking to 
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oust sitting tenants to take action themselves by royal brieve.  From the 1230s on, there 
are a number of cases in which actions about land were raised in lords’ courts but by 
means of the king’s brieve.123  The evidence is too thin to allow firm conclusions to be 
drawn; but these brieves may well have been royal orders addressed to the court 
commanding that right be done.  And if proceedings like this became at all common, 
then it can only have been a short step to the rule, long established in the English 
common law, that an action over a claim to land could only be commenced with a royal 
command.124  At that point, whenever it occurred (and it must have been before 1270, 
when we have our first statement of this rule), royal justice had laid claim to an exclusive 
power to deal with certain types of dispute.  Further, another weapon had been created 
with which the Church’s claims to jurisdiction could be fought off.  A major step had 
been taken towards the creation of a Scottish secular common law. 
 
In sum, therefore, while during the reign of Alexander II royal justice clearly built 
on foundations already laid in the course of the twelfth century, it also became more 
articulate and systematic, and began to assert much more strongly not just ultimate, but 
also exclusive jurisdiction within the realm in relation to secular land.  The claims of the 
ecclesiastical courts were resisted and circumscribed, and the courts of local lords were 
subjected to more intensive supervision and scrutiny.  A key instrument in this process 
was the royal brieve, by the increasingly standardised forms of which the claims of royal 
justice were made apparent in both secular and ecclesiastical fora.  A greater awareness of 
the existence and significance of an independent legal system is apparent too in the 
writing down, at the very end of the reign in 1249, of the hitherto customary Laws of the 
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Marches,125 “another aspect of the sharpening recognition on each side of the Border 
that to allow the king’s subjects to be treated under the law of another kingdom would be 
in prejudice of royal authority and national identity”.126   
 
But it would be wrong to see the legal developments of this period purely as a 
reaction to the presence of competing authorities such as the Church and the king of 
England.  In particular, the Church can be seen to have provided an impetus for change 
quite apart from the breadth of its jurisdictional claims.  As the guardian of the spiritual 
and moral health of Christendom, it brought a wholly different kind of pressure to bear 
upon secular law and custom, a pressure which seems to have borne fruit in Scotland.  
The most obvious example discussed or mentioned in this paper is the success of the 
ecclesiastical attack upon the judicium Dei, and the deployment in its place of the inquest 
or jury.  But many other instances can be given.  The fundamental concept of default of 
justice as a means of expanding royal jurisdiction was transplanted from the canon law.  
Criminal law, and in particular the gradations of homicide, seems to be informed by the 
moral perceptions of the Church, as does the desire, already evident in the twelfth 
century, to repress the settlement of feud by private settlement rather than by just 
punishment.  The canon law of marriage, legitimacy and status not only challenged the 
lax customs of the laity but came to lie at the heart of the secular rules about the 
inheritance of land.  We may also suspect that it was the Church which was the most 
important influence in establishing the right of women to inherit despite much contrary 
social practice.  In this way the development of Scots law was exposed to the influence 
of wider patterns of development in Europe.  At the same time it drew inspiration from 
the rising common law of England, while retaining much from a past that stretched back 
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beyond the twelfth century.  In 1254, five years after the death of King Alexander, Pope 
Innocent IV issued the bull Dolentes, identifying Scotland as a land where the affairs of 
the laity were governed by lay customs and those of the church by the canons of the holy 
fathers.127  Understandably the Pope did not dwell on the interplay just observed 
between the lay customs and the canon law, but it was already, and would continue to be, 
a vital ingredient in the emergence of a distinctive common law of Scotland. 
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